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Abstract
We compare the empirical performance of the unitary and the collective
approach to modelling observed labour supply behaviour. A nonpara-
metric analysis is conducted, which avoids the distortive impact of an
erroneously speciﬁed functional form for the preferences and/or the in-
trahousehold bargaining process. Our analysis focuses on the goodness-
of-ﬁt of the two behavioural models. To guarantee a fair comparison, we
complement this goodness-of-ﬁt analysis with a power analysis. Our re-
sults strongly favour the collective approach to modelling the behaviour
of multi-person households.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Standard microeconomic theory assumes that a household acts as if it were a
single decision maker. Within this tradition, household demand is assumed to
result from maximizing a unique utility function subject to a household bud-
get constraint. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that this unitary
model is at odds with observed household behaviour; the associated restric-
tions of homogeneity, symmetry and negativity have been rejected at numerous
occasions (e.g., Fortin and Lacroix, 1997, and Browning and Chiappori, 1998).
A more recent alternative, the so-called collective approach to household
behaviour (Chiappori, 1988, 1992), explicitly takes account of the fact that
multi-person households consist of several individuals with their own rational
preferences; household decisions are then the Pareto eﬃcient outcomes of a bar-
gaining process. This collective approach entails other behavioural restrictions
than the unitary model. Interestingly enough, these restrictions seem to better
ﬁt the data than the unitary restrictions; e.g., Browning et al. (1994), Fortin
and Lacroix (1997), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori et al. (2002)
and Vermeulen (2004).
Still, the hitherto employed tests of the unitary and collective models are
parametric in nature. Hence, they crucially depend on the functional form that
is used for representing the preferences and/or the intrahousehold bargaining
process. They do not only test the unitary or collective approach as such, but
also an ad hoc functional speciﬁcation; rejecting the unitary restrictions may
well be due to ill-speciﬁcation.
Nonparametric tests for consistency of observed behaviour with utility max-
imization or Pareto eﬃciency do not require any assumptions regarding the
parametric form of utility functions or the intrahousehold bargaining process;
see, e.g., Afriat (1967), Varian (1982), Chiappori (1988) and Snyder (2000).
These tests are solely based on revealed preference theory, which makes them
particularly attractive for testing consistency of the data with theoretical be-
havioural models.
This directly suggests using nonparametric testing tools for comparing the
empirical performance of the unitary and collective models. However, to the
best of our knowledge, an in-depth nonparametric comparison has not yet been
carried out. This paper wants to ﬁll that gap, by studying the speciﬁcc a s eo f
household labour supply behaviour. Conveniently, our focus on labour supply
also guarantees substantial price/wage variation across individuals, which can
only beneﬁt the empirical comparison.
Our following assessment speciﬁcally concentrates on two types of (nonpara-
metric) empirical performance measures: goodness-of-ﬁt measures and power
measures. We indeed believe that a fair comparison of the two behavioural
models under study should complement a goodness-of-ﬁt analysis with a power
analysis: favourable goodness-of-ﬁt results, indicating few violations of the be-
havioural restrictions, have little meaning if the behavioural implications have
low power, i.e., optimizing behaviour can hardly be rejected.
Our empirical evaluation uses a cross-section dataset of Belgian households
(consisting of working individuals), which we divide in three subsamples: female
singles, male singles and couples. We essentially discuss two types of compar-
isons:
- First, we compare the empirical performance of the unitary model for singles
2with that for couples. The rationale of this comparison is that the standard
unitary approach should always be fully applicable to singles, even if it does not
well ﬁt the observed behaviour of couples. This ﬁrst comparison should give
us a deeper understanding of the harmless/harmful nature of the aggregation
assumptions that underlie the unitary modelling of couples’ behaviour.
- Second, we compare the empirical results of the collective model with those of
the unitary model, both applied to the data of couples. Because the collective
and unitary models evidently have diﬀerent implications for couples’ behaviour,
these results should give us a better insight into which of the models does the
better job in describing multi-person household consumption behaviour.
Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the nonparametric methodology for testing the uni-
tary and the collective labour supply models. In addition, we introduce the
nonparametric goodness-of-ﬁt and power measures. Section 3 presents the re-
sults of our application to Belgian household data. Section 4 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 Testing the unitary model
For the sake of compactness, we only discuss unitary consistency tests for couples
with two working individuals (M and F). Our discussion is directly translated
to the singles’ case.
The nonparametric approach starts from n observations for household con-
sumption and the household members’ labour supply. For each household i
(i =1 ,...,n) we denote the net wage rate and leisure amount of individual
I (I = M,F) by wI
i and lI
i, respectively. (The leisure amount is computed
from observed labour supply  I
i = T − lI
i,w i t hT the individuals’ time endow-
ment.) Next, we use yi and ci to respectively denote household i’s nonlabour












Within the unitary model, the decision problem of each household i boils











i ≤ yi + wM
i T + wF
i T; without losing
generality, we set the price of consumption to 1. A necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the data to be consistent with this utility maximization problem
is that there exists a function v that rationalizes the household data, i.e., for all



















j ≤ yi + wM
i T + wF
i T. (1)
Varian (1982) has demonstrated that such a data rationalizing utility func-
tion exists if and only if the observed set S is consistent with the general-
ized axiom of revealed preference (GARP). To formally state this last consis-
tency condition, we ﬁrst need the following revealed preference deﬁnition (using ¡
1,wM,w F¢0 = w and
¡
c,lM,l F¢0 = l):





jlk,. . . ,w0
mlm ≥ w0
ml f o rs o m es e q u e n c eo f
observations (li,lj,...,lm).
3We can now deﬁne the GARP condition as:





jl for RPj = {li : liRlj;i ∈ {1,...,n}}.
This deﬁnition expresses the idea that observation j is (theoretically) utility
maximizing under its budget constraint if and only if it is expenditure minimiz-
ing over its ‘better than’ set; in the (empirical) GARP condition this last set is
approximated by the ‘revealed preferred’ set RPj.
Consistency of S with GARP is easily tested: we ﬁrst identify the set RPj
and consequently check the expenditure minimization condition. See Varian
(1982; p. 949) for an eﬃcient algorithm.
2.2 Testing the collective model
We focus on the collective consumption model with egoistic preferences; pref-
erences only depend on own consumption and leisure (Chiappori, 1988). More-
over, we assume that there is no public consumption in the household.1 Em-
pirically, the modelling of this collective approach is somewhat more involved
as the private consumption of each household member is usually not observed;
labour supply datasets only reveal information on total household consumption.











¢0 by respectively wI
i and lI
i (I = M,F).U s i n g
this, we consider the case where each couple i is characterized by a pair of

















that determines the distribution of the household’s nonlabour
income yi over the household members (see Chiappori, 1988):

















¢0 such that yM
i + yF
i = yi.
The sharing rule concept allows us to model household behaviour as a two-
stage budgeting process. After dividing total nonlabour income in the ﬁrst stage,
















which is formally similar to the unitary household decision problem; see (1).
Chiappori (1992) has demonstrated that the resulting household allocation is
always Pareto eﬃcient.
This alternative interpretation of Pareto eﬃcient household behaviour is
particularly convenient within the nonparametric context, as it entails the same
kind of GARP tests as for the unitary model: if we knew private consumption
for each observation (cM
i and cF
i ), then we could immediately check consistency
1The analysis is in fact also applicable to individual caring preferences,w h i c hc a nb e





(I = M,F);s e e
Chiappori (1992) for a detailed discussion. Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2004) provide
a nonparametric characterization of a general collective model with public goods and exter-
nalities. Given the current paper’s objective, we focus on a rather simple collective model,
which can be considered as a direct generalization of the unitary model.
4of the observed set S by using the standard GARP tests at the level of the
household members. In practice, however, we do not observe the intrahousehold
allocation of total consumption. This entails the following empirical condition
for the collective model (see also Chiappori, 1988):
Deﬁnition 4 The observed set S is consistent with collective rationalization



















i ≤ yi + wM
i T + wF
i T
and
GARP is satisﬁed at the individual level (I = M,F):







Thus, given that the intrahousehold consumption allocation is not observed,
we only need that there exists at least one feasible allocation entailing individual







i); i =1 ,...,n; I = M, F} that are
consistent with GARP for both individuals.
Snyder (2000) introduced an ‘all-or-nothing’ nonparametric test for the col-
lective model.2 In that test, either data satisfy collective rationality or they
do not. We follow a diﬀerent approach, induced by our speciﬁcf o c u so nt h e
goodness-of-ﬁt of the alternative behavioural models. Our starting point is that
the collective rationalization test boils down to standard GARP tests conditional
upon an intrahousehold consumption allocation (cM
i and cF
i ). Speciﬁcally, we
impute (unobserved) member-speciﬁc private consumption amounts by exploit-
ing a systematic ﬁnding in parametric studies of collective labour supply, namely
the apparently positive correlation between the male/female member’s share of
total nonlabour income and the corresponding individual wage (e.g., Chiappori
et al., 2002, and Vermeulen, 2004).
Using this, our nonparametric testing exercise considers the following pair of
distributions for the female consumption share sF
i (= cF
i /ci; the corresponding
male share equals 1−sF
i ): the ﬁrst distribution has mean 0.45 and a cumulative
probability of 95% for the values between 0.40 and 0.50; the second distribution
has mean 0.55 and a cumulative probability of 95% for the values between
0.50 and 0.60. From these distributions, we draw 1000 combinations of sF
i




i )t h e nsF
i is drawn from the
ﬁrst (second) distribution. We subsequently select the combination of shares
with the highest number of individual (male and female) household members
passing the associated GARP tests. This combination is used for comparing the
empirical performance of the collective model with that of the unitary model.3
As a ﬁnal note, we emphasize that this approach does not guarantee the
most favourable treatment of the collective model: to ensure computational
tractability, our procedure restricts attention to a limited number of possible
combinations of intrahousehold allocations; there may well exist other, non-
investigated combinations that are associated with an even higher number of
2In her analysis, Snyder restricts attention to the case n=2, while we consider the more
general case; e.g., in our application n=281 (see Section 3.1).
3We have also experimented with alternative means for the above normal distributions
(including a rule where both distributions have mean 0.50). But this did not yield a higher
number of (male and female) household members passing the GARP tests.
5individuals consistent with GARP. We can therefore state that our empirical
analysis implicitly gives the ‘beneﬁt of the doubt’ to the unitary model.
2.3 Empirical performance: goodness-of-ﬁt
The consistency tests reviewed above are ‘sharp’ tests; they only tell us whether
observations are exactly optimizing in terms of the behavioural model that is
under evaluation. However, as argued by Varian (1990), exact optimization
is not a very interesting hypothesis. Rather, we want to know whether the
behavioural model under study provides a reasonable way to describe observed
behaviour; for most purposes, ‘nearly optimizing behaviour’ is just as good as
‘optimizing’ behaviour. Varian’s argument is all the more valid in the context
of comparing theoretical behavioural models: we are primarily interested in the
extent to which one model ‘ﬁts’ the observed data better than the other model.
Therefore, our following assessment will be based on measures of goodness-of-ﬁt.
Our goodness-of-ﬁt measure is the ‘improved violation index’ (or ‘eﬃciency
index’) proposed by Varian (1993; based on Afriat, 1973; see also Cox, 1997),
which indicates the degree to which the data are ‘optimizing’ (or ‘eﬃcient’) in
the sense of the evaluated behavioural model. More speciﬁcally, this index gives
for each observation the minimal perturbation of the expenditure level that
guarantees consistency of the observed set S with GARP. See Varian (1993)
and Cox (1997) for in-depth formal discussions of this goodness-of-ﬁtm e a s u r e .
2.4 Empirical performance: power
We compute four diﬀerent power measures. A ﬁrst distinction relates to the
consumption data that is used. The ﬁrst dataset (used for the measures Power1a
and Power1b) consists of the original consumption and leisure data for the
unitary model and the combination of observed and partly imputed data for
the collective model. The second dataset (used for the measures Power2a and
Power2b) multiplies the original expenditure level for each observation with
the corresponding improved violation index value (at the household level for
the unitary model and at the individual level for the collective model); this
anticipates the question to what extent the necessary data perturbation for
obtaining GARP consistency (captured by the improved violation index) would
eﬀectively impact on the power estimates.
For each dataset we compute two types of power measures proposed by
Bronars (1987). The distinction between the two types essentially pertains to
the ‘mimicking’ of irrational behaviour àl aBecker (1962), by means of a spe-
ciﬁc randomization procedure for constructing irrational consumption bundles;
each power measure then captures the probability of detecting that irrational
behaviour. The ﬁrst type of measures, labelled Power1a (Power2a) for the ﬁrst
(second) dataset, uses Bronars’ ﬁrst algorithm; the second type of measures,
labelled Power1b (Power2b) for the ﬁrst (second) dataset, uses Bronars’ sec-
ond algorithm. We refer to Bronars for formal deﬁnitions, and restrict here to
indicating that the ﬁrst algorithm generally implies a greater probability than
the second one of generating (irrational) consumption bundles near the ‘cor-
ners’ of the budget line. Or conversely, the second algorithm makes ‘extreme’
(irrational) behaviour less likely than the ﬁrst one.
6For a given data set and randomization procedure, the speciﬁc construction
of the power measures ﬁrst simulates irrational/random behaviour for each ob-
servation, and subsequently checks consistency with the GARP condition for
each observation. In our empirical application, we repeat this procedure 200
times. The proportion of rejections of GARP (over these 200 replications) then
gives the probability of detecting irrational behaviour of each observation, given
random behaviour of the other observations.
Hence, for each behavioural model that we evaluate we measure power in
each element of the observed set S. This practice contrasts with e.g. Bronars
(1987) and Cox (1997), who provide overall power measures that are based on
the entire sample. Their measures reveal the probability that random behaviour
of at least one observation in the sample is detected. In our opinion, evaluating
power at the level of individual observations is more informative. For example,
it provides a more detailed insight into the extent to which the diﬀerent obser-
vations can cause rejection of the model under study; we believe that there is a
stronger case for a model that has high power in many observations than for a
model with high power in only a few observations. Also, an observation-speciﬁc
power measure naturally links up with our observation-speciﬁc goodness-of-ﬁt
measure; persistently high goodness-of-ﬁt values for a given sample of observa-
tions are all the more convincing evidence in favour of a particular behavioural
model if they are complemented with high power values for the same sample.
3 Application
3.1 Data and methodological issues
Our data are drawn from the 1992 and 1997 waves of the Socio-Economic Panel
(SEP) of the Center for Social Policy (University of Antwerp). We focus on three
subsamples: female singles, male singles and couples. The ﬁrst two subsamples
consist of female and male singles that meet the following criteria: no children,
aged between 25 and 55 and employed. The third subsample consists of (de-
facto) couples, where the household members meet the same criteria as the
selected singles. To minimize the impact of measurement error, we have trimmed
out from each subsample those households that include a (female/male) member
with a wage that lies above the 97.5 percentile or below the 2.5 percentile of the
empirical (female/male) wage distribution. This yields samples of 123 single
females, 173 single males and 281 couples. The Appendix reports summary
statistics for each subsample.
Cox (1997) and Snyder (2000) also conduct nonparametric tests of labour
supply behaviour on micro-data. They test consistency with GARP on time-
series data and, hence, they exclude preference variation over time. Our analysis
deviates in that we assume constant preferences in each cross-section subsample
(female singles, male singles and couples); in each subsample, all observations
correspond to the same preferences but to diﬀerent price regimes. Our motiva-
tion for this particular preference homogeneity assumption is threefold. Firstly,
the SEP was subject to substantial attrition between 1992 and 1997: because
many new households entered the data set in 1997, only a small number of
households were observed in both waves of the SEP; there are too few house-
holds with two consecutive observations for robust nonparametric testing based
7on time-series data. Secondly, our selection criteria ensure relatively homoge-
neous subsamples, which makes that our equal preference assumption does not
seem overly strong.4 Finally, and importantly, recall that we focus on goodness-
of-ﬁt measures in our following analysis. Obviously, this practice anticipates
some preference variation over households.
3.2 Singles versus couples
Figure 1 presents the cumulative distribution functions (c.d.f.’s) of the goodness-
of-ﬁt measures (i.e., the improved violation indexes, in ascending order) associ-
ated with the unitary model for female singles, male singles and couples.5 When
restricting to the ‘sharp’ GARP condition, we would conclude rejection for all
three subsamples; relatively few observations have an index value that equals
100%. We note that this result should not be very surprising in view of our
preference homogeneity assumption. It seems more meaningful to look at the
entire distribution of the goodness-of-ﬁtm e a s u r e .
[Figure 1 about here]
When considering the c.d.f.’s more closely, we observe important diﬀerences
between couples and singles. Firstly, we ﬁnd that 55% of the female singles and
69% of the male singles are fully eﬃcient, as opposed to only 17% of the couples.
Secondly, and more importantly, the index values of couples are generally below
those of singles; the couples’ distribution is stochastically dominated by the
two singles’ distributions. One-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests conﬁrm this
overall picture: the null hypothesis of equal distributions of couples on the one
hand and male and female singles on the other hand is rejected in favour of
the alternative hypothesis that the couples’ index systematically lies below the
respective singles’ indexes; see Table 1.
As discussed before, it is recommendable to complement this goodness-of-ﬁt
analysis with a power analysis. Figure 2 presents the c.d.f.’s of the individually
calculated Power1a indexes for single females, single males and couples.6 This
ﬁgure reveals high power for most observations: 96% of the couples, 92% of the
male singles and 89% of the female singles have a power index value that exceeds
95%; for these observations, irrational/random behaviour will be detected with
a probability of at least 95%. More generally, while the overall power for couples
appears to be slightly higher than for female and male singles, Figure 2 suggests
that the diﬀerences remain marginal. This impression is conﬁrmed by one-
tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests: we cannot reject (at the 5% signiﬁcance level)
equality of the c.d.f.’s in favour of the alternative hypothesis that the power
index values for female and male singles are lower than those for couples; see
Table 1.
4Compare, e.g., with Famulari (1995): (in a unitary framework) this author analyses con-
sistency of observed behaviour with GARP for homogenous subgroups of households that are
identiﬁed on the basis of similar selection criteria.
5For expositional convenience, the c.d.f.’s have been cut oﬀ at the 91% eﬃciency level since
no observation has a violation index below that ﬁgure. We also explicitly distinguish between
indexes that are equal to 1 and those that are less than 1.
6In contrast to Figure 1, Figure 2 presents the whole c.d.f. The reason is that a few
observations have very low power indexes.
8We obtain similar results for the other three power measures.7 First, the
measure Power2a entails exactly the same qualitative conclusions as Power1a:
power index values are generally very high, while equality of the c.d.f.’s for the
three subsamples cannot be rejected. Finally, for the measures Power1b and
Power2b we reject equality of the c.d.f.’s for singles and couples in favour of
the alternative hypothesis that couples are associated with higher power index
values than male and female singles. But also in this case the power index values
remain generally very high for the diﬀerent subsamples.
We conclude that the relatively poor performance of the unitary model for
describing observed couples’ behaviour (when compared to singles’ behaviour)
can hardly be attributed solely to higher power of the model for the associated
couples’ consistency tests. In our opinion, these ﬁndings strongly question the
harmless nature of the aggregation assumptions in the unitary approach to
modelling couples’ behaviour.
[Figure 2 about here]
[Table 1 about here]
3.3 Unitary versus collective model
Our previous ﬁndings cast doubts on the usefulness of the unitary model for an-
alyzing couples’ behaviour. As a natural next step, we now investigate whether
the collective approach provides a better alternative for modelling couples’ be-
haviour, by comparing its empirical performance with that of the unitary model.
Like before, our unitary results refer to GARP tests at the aggregate household
level. By contrast, our collective results are obtained from applying GARP
tests to the individual members of each couple, hereby using the intrahousehold
allocations obtained by the procedure described in Section 2.2.
Figure 3 presents the c.d.f.’s of the goodness-of-ﬁt measure for couples (in
the unitary model) and female and male household members (in the collec-
tive model). In line with our earlier results, substantially more individuals than
aggregate households behave consistently with the utility maximization hypoth-
esis: 53% of the men and 58% of the women are 100% eﬃcient, while only 17%
of the couples attain an improved violation index value of 100%. In fact, Fig-
ure 3 reveals a picture that is roughly similar to that in Figure 1: the (unitary)
couples’ distribution is stochastically dominated by the (collective) distributions
of the male and female household members. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test re-
sults in Table 2 provide further evidence in support of the collective model: the
null hypothesis of equal c.d.f.’s is strongly rejected in favour of the alternative
hypothesis that the couples’ improved violation index systematically lies below
that for women and men in the collective model.
[Figure 3 about here]
Again, we complement this goodness-of-ﬁt analysis with a power analysis.
Our power results persistently indicate that the better ﬁt of the collective model
is not due to lower power; the hypothesis that there are no power diﬀerences is
even better supported than in Section 3.2, where we observed slightly (although
7For the sake of brevity, we do not report the results here. But, of course, they are available
from the authors upon request. This qualiﬁcation equally applies for our discussion of the
same power measures in Section 3.3.
9not always signiﬁcantly) higher power of the unitary model in the couples’ case
than in the singles’ case. For example, Figure 4 clearly shows that the distrib-
u t i o no ft h ePower1a values is practically the same for couples (in the unitary
model) and individuals (in the collective model). This observation is formalized
in Table 2: one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reveal that equality of the
c.d.f.’s of the power indexes cannot be rejected. Moreover, the power indexes
are generally high: 96% of the couples (in the unitary model), 96% of the fe-
males and 95% of the males (in the collective model) have a power index that
amounts to at least 95%. Just like in Section 3.2, we have checked the sensitiv-
ity of these power results. Interestingly, the measures Power2a, Power1b and
Power2b entail exactly the same qualitative conclusions as Power1a.
In our opinion, these results provide strong enough evidence to argue that the
collective approach performs signiﬁcantly better than the unitary approach for
modelling couples’ labour supply behaviour. In fact, this argument becomes all
the more convincing when taking into account our rather rudimentary procedure
to model the distribution of household consumption over the diﬀerent household
members; more reﬁned allocation rules can only beneﬁt the relative performance
of the collective model.
[Figure 4 about here]
[Table 2 about here]
4C o n c l u s i o n
We have compared the empirical performance of the unitary model to describe
household labour supply behaviour with that of the more recently developed
collective model. Our ﬁndings strongly suggest using the collective model for
analyzing the behaviour of households consisting of multiple individuals:
- First, we found that the unitary model performs signiﬁcantly worse when
applied to couples than when applied to singles. As these results can hardly
be attributed to power diﬀerences, we conclude that they signal violations of
the preference aggregation assumptions that underlie the unitary approach, i.e.,
that multi-person households behave as single decision makers.
- Second, and probably more importantly, a direct comparison of the collective
model with the unitary model provided additional evidence to support the use
of the collective model: it ﬁts observed couples’ behaviour much better than the
unitary model. Again, this signiﬁcant diﬀerence cannot be explained by power
diﬀerences. Hence, our ﬁndings do not only indicate that the unitary approach
is too restrictive for modelling the behaviour of multi-person households, but
also that the collective model constitutes a more promising alternative.
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Figure 1: Unitary model singles and couples: cumulative distribution function





























































































Figure 3: Unitary versus collective model couples: cumulative distribution func-















































Figure 4: Unitary versus collective model couples: cumulative distribution func-
tion of power
Table 1: Diﬀerences between singles and couples
Imp. viol. index Power index
Single women vs. couples 0.000 0.055
Single men vs. couples 0.000 0.290
Entries show the probability that the null hypothesis of equal distribution is
true, as computed on the basis of a one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; we
compare the distributions of the improved violation index and the power index
f o rc o u p l e sw i t ht h er e s p e c t i v ed i s t r i b u t i o n sf o rs i n g l ew o m e na n ds i n g l em e n .
14Table 2: Diﬀerences between the unitary model and the collective model
Imp. viol. index Power index
women vs. couples 0.000 0.991
men vs. couples 0.000 0.958
Entries show the probability that the null hypothesis of equal distribution is
true, as computed on the basis of a one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; we
compare the distributions of the improved violation index and the power index
for couples in the unitary model with the respective distributions for women
and men in the collective model.
Table 3: Sample statistics
Couples Single males Single females
Variable Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Weekly working hours male 37.90 7.20 37.27 4.73
Weekly working hours female 34.62 7.62 35.17 7.51
Net hourly wage rate male 9.26 3.45 8.87 4.04
Net hourly wage rate female 7.23 2.51 8.14 3.17
Age male 35.82 8.67 37.56 8.34
Age female 33.79 8.45 37.48 9.91
Dummy primary education male 0.04 0.20 0.09 0.28
Dummy secondary education male 0.54 0.50 0.58 0.49
Dummy non-academic higher education male 0.30 0.46 0.26 0.44
Dummy academic higher education male 0.12 0.32 0.07 0.26
Dummy primary education female 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.29
Dummy secondary education female 0.52 0.50 0.41 0.49
Dummy non-academic higher education female 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.48
Dummy academic higher education female 0.09 0.28 0.16 0.37
Dummy Brussels Capital Region 0.05 0.22 0.10 0.30 0.20 0.40
Dummy Flanders Region 0.73 0.44 0.59 0.49 0.51 0.50
Dummy Walloon Region 0.21 0.41 0.31 0.46 0.29 0.46
Weekly nonlabour income 19.45 54.33 13.54 46.36 16.36 46.75
Dummy wave 1997 0.51 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.51 0.50
Note: Source: Belgian Socio-Economic Panel 1992-1997. Monetary variables are in 1997
euro.
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